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Abstract 
While audit quality has been widely investigated on the global scale, little research has been conducted on the 
determinants of Audit quality for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and in the context of Uganda. This 
article is motivated by the unending observations of audit quality determinants being unclear and indecisive. Using 
a cross sectional research design and a quantitative approach with the aid of a self-administered questionnaire, this 
article investigates what the finance/procurement managers for NGOs in Uganda perceive to be the key quality 
determinants for the work done by auditors. Whereas results generally reveal that auditor fees, auditor firm size, 
auditor competence, auditor independence, and number of audit assignments significantly relate with audit quality, 
auditor tenure and auditor age were found to have insignificant effects on audit quality. This article therefore 
provides more insightful evidence about the ongoing discussions on the determinants of audit quality for NGOs in 
Sub-Saharan African, particularly from the Ugandan perspective.  
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1. Introduction 
Audit is a governance function to which auditors express opinions regarding the truthfulness and fairness of the 
financial and other operational statements ( for example, on procurement systems, structures and processes) 
associated with activities undertaken by reporting organisations (Tumwebaze, Mukyala, Ssekiziyivu, Tirisa, & 
Tumwebonire, 2018). As such audits would provide the assurance and confidence to the users about the actual 
performance as well as the correct reporting of performing organisations (Bananuka, Nkundabanyanga, Nalukenge, 
& Kaawaase, 2018). At an individual level, auditors thus have a duty to nurture their expertise, have the appropriate 
qualifications, and develop the right skills to deliver financial and procurement statement opinions among others 
that are relevant unbiased, and of accurate position; and at an organizational level, many other factors are at play 
including internal control systems of the performing firm and the size of the audit firm, though audit firm size has 
had mixed responses (Al-Khaddash, Al Nawas & Ramadan, 2013).  
Different authorities provide guidance to the audit profession (See, The US Advisory Committee on the 
Auditing Profession, 2008; The Australia Treasury Audit Quality – a Strategic Review, 2010; The UK Financial 
Reporting Council-Audit Quality Framework, 2008), but with limited focus on the quality of audits for NGOs, yet 
NGOs have tremendously grown in number and donors heavily fund them with the belief that they have the 
potential to fill the public service delivery gaps of government (Damba, 2018; MIA Press Release, 7th August 
2019).  Such makes auditing and determining of the true performance of NGOs very challenging (Lehman, 2007; 
Humanitarian Financing Task Team, 2016; Joint Inspection Unit, 2017). While more recently audit guidelines 
have become paramount for the operations of NGOs, globally the credibility of their audit processes, audit 
outcomes, auditors’ role and the overall corporate governance aspects remain questionable (Horvat & Bobek, 
2019). This has led to the formulation of policy measures such as a ban on audit firms taking on non-audit services, 
rapid adoption of Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) and internal auditor independence by not undertaking self-reviews 
(Al-Khaddash, et al., 2013). 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned audit reforms, empirical evidence still shows that the determinants of 
audit quality are unclear and  indecisive (Kaawaase, Assad, Kitindi, & Nkundabanyanga, 2016). This study offers 
empirical evidence on the perceptions of what determines the quality of audit with regard to audit firm 
characteristics and the usefulness of audit teams to ensure trustworthiness and confidence of the public in the audit 
report outcomes and the integrity of the financial reporting system of NGOs (Shockley, 1981; Pany & Reckers 
1988). 
Exploring audit quality in Ugandan NGO sector is noteworthy based on the prominence of getting a high 
quality audit process in the Ugandan non-governmental organisations. One of the momentous sectors in Uganda 
is the NGO sector which is important in the Ugandan economy with the role of bridging the gaps that government 
funding and operations may not sufficiently reach or cover but also creating efficiency in public service provision. 
However, Kaawaase et al. (2016)  reveal challenges in measuring audit quality in both developed and emerging 
economies. Revelations in the New Vision as reported by Mubiru (2020) indicate that some accountants do not 
perform audits to the level of quality expected of them, calling for disciplinary action by the Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants of Uganda, the Institute of Procurement Professionals of Uganda as well as the Public 
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Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority. Inappropriate audit quality might be against high risks of 
corruption, the potential for fraud and unethical business practices, extreme poverty and conflict among others in 
environments where these NGOs operate, Uganda inclusive (Manley, 2018). Kasigwa, Munene, Ntayi, & Nkote 
(2013) find that some auditors engage in practices like accepting client explanations to audit issues to substitute 
other audit evidence that can be got as well. Such practices can potentially reduce the audit quality. Also, low 
financial and procurement accountability is cited among Uganda’s non-profit organisations, reporting 31 percent 
of them not having complete financial and procurement information or having information with significant errors 
(Dang, Burger, & Owens, 2019). This is against objectives of audits that are intended to support NGOs in order to 
take corrective actions over their financial and procurement information. This can be interpreted as a sign of lapses 
in audit quality. Exploring audit quality practices in non-governmental organisations’ sector might support 
improved accountability within this sector. The aim of this study therefore is to examine the determinants of 
auditing quality in the Ugandan NGOs from the viewpoints of their finance/procurement managers, and to make 
a contribution to the existing audit quality literature. 
 
1.1 Theoretical framework 
The services of auditors are demanded as monitoring tools due to potential conflicts of interest between business 
owners and those among different shareholders which can increase agency costs (see Watts, 1977; Benston, 1980; 
Watts & Zimmerman, 1981).  To ably execute their monitoring role, auditors should be independent with 
reasonable tenure (Kaawaase & Nkundabanyanga, 2017), competent (Ferdinand, Syaifuddin, Dali, & Masud, 
2019), and their firm size (Ndubuisi & Ezechukwu, 2017), fees (Choi, Kim and Zang, 2010), number of audit 
assignments and auditor age (Persson, 2011) should be of reasonable magnitude. Audit quality as an output of the 
audit process is a sign that auditors are effectively undertaking their role of monitoring management activities 
(Chersan, 2019) as guided by the agency theory. 
 
2. Literature review 
In absence of an inclusive audit quality definition covering the different categories of audits and auditors (Al-
Khaddash, et al., 2013), we adopt the definition from DeAngelo (1981) that refers to audit quality as a probability 
that the auditor will both discover and report a breach in the client’s accounting and procurement system based on 
the applicable audit standards and procedures.  This description is suitable for both external and internal audits 
whether programmatic or compliance in nature. 
Audit quality comes into play when the principal engages an agent to perform a service on his/her behalf.  
The principal-agent relationship implies that the principal trusts the agent to act in his/her best interests, which 
may not always be the case as the agent might instead work against the principal’s interests. This suggests that an 
auditor must be deployed to oversee the performance of the agent (Retzl, 2017).    
Several studies reveal that audit quality might be guaranteed by employing auditors who have the right 
experience, are honest and with the knowledge and skills in accounting, procurement and auditing standards 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Hameed, 1995). On the other hand, Alqam and Alrajabi (1997), and Abbott and Parker (2000) 
discovered that auditor rotation could be very appropriate for audit quality assurance but noted that such might 
only be influenced by management replacement, audit office, enthusiastic and independent audit committees, and 
international auditing standards and ethical requirements.   Furthermore, Abbott, Parker, Peters and Raghunandan 
(2003) and Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004) acknowledge that an independent and active audit committee are 
more likely to demand greater audit quality level arising from monetary and reputational loss trepidations. 
Kaawaase and Nkundabanyanga (2017) contend that auditor independence is critical in ensuring that the interests 
of stakeholders are safeguarded, and such is consistent with Brown et al. (2006) recognition of auditor 
independence enhancing financial and/or procurement disclosure quality. Finally, Omonuk and Oni (2015) 
established that developing country firms that employ computer assisted audit techniques (CAATs) yield positive 
and significant influence on audit quality as opposed to those that apply traditional methodologies.  Aroused by 
the fact that firm and individual characteristics are generally associated with audits (DeAngelo, 1981; Hameed, 
1995; Parker et al. 2003; Brown et al. 2006), we hypothesize that audit quality for NGOs in Uganda may be 
influenced by firm size, auditor fees, auditor independence, auditor tenure, auditor competence, number of audit 
assignments, and the age of the auditor.  
 
2.1 Firm size and audit quality  
Big Audit firms are presumed to conduct more accurate tests therefore more likely to be associated with precise 
information than their small audit firms as a way of protecting the brand name and reputation of the organisation 
for business continuity. Auditor independence, competence and associated with larger forecast errors as 
characteristics of firm size which are indeed positively related with audit quality (Suseno & Nofianti, 2018; Beatty, 
1989).  
Big audit firms are well structured in terms of talented employees and superior technology which may support 
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their advanced audit performance compared to small audit firms (Ndubuisi & Ezechukwu, 2017; Francis & Wilson, 
1988; DeAngelo, 1981), and can exert more pressure on management because of their client portfolios (Mahdi & 
Ali, 2009; Lys & Watts, 1994). The expectation is that financial and procurement statements that have been audited 
by large firms will have minimal errors and misstatements arising from self-interests (Rezaei & Shabani, 2014). 
Dopuch and Simunic (1982) note that audit quality is a function of the number of and the extent to which audit 
procedures are performed, and tasks that big audit firms can easily do as they have access to more resources than 
small audit firms. This implies that where firm size and audit quality are positively associated, large differences 
are likely to exist between reported and forecasted incomes for entities audited by large auditors than with small 
auditors after controlling for client risky characteristics (Rezaei & Shabani, 2014). In a conducted experiment of 
six large and small audit firms, Krishnan and Schauer (2000) found out that compliance increases as one moves 
from the small to large audit firm size category, while because large audit firms have the capacity to employ a 
reasonable number of professional auditors than small audit firms can do.  
H1: Audit firm size have an effect on audit quality.  
 
2.2 Auditor fees and audit quality 
According to Hoitash, Markelevich and Barragato (2007) auditor fees refers to costs that client organizations incur 
to pay for the audit and other accompanying services provided  by audit firms. Such fees are meant to enable field 
and office staff undertake field audit activities, as well as assure the audit firm of the realization of the expect profit 
of the audits pursued.  The common ways of arriving at audit fees to be charged are low-balling (where the auditor 
sets low audit fees for a new client) and the estimated cost plus margin (the costs that the auditor expects to spend 
on the assignment and adds a percentage for the profit) (Kinney & Libby, 2002).  Francis and Simon (1987) suggest 
that audit fees differentiate the quality of audits to be provided in a competitive world. Deis and Giroux (1996) 
asserts that client organizations are likely to pay higher audit fees (premium inclusive) as long as they believe that 
the auditors will deliver high quality audit services. While there is enough evidence showing audit premiums to be 
an important component of the audits (Al-Khaddash, et al., 2013; Craswell, Francis & Taymor,1995), such may 
not always be the case (Chaney, Jeter & Shivakumar, 2002). Under normal circumstances a moderate audit 
premium fee should be offered since excessively high audit fees tend to compromise the auditors’ reporting (Choi, 
Kim and Zang, 2010). 
Notwithstanding the mixed evidence on the relationship between audit fees and audit quality, with the Ugandan 
context, we hypothesize as follows;  
H2: Auditor fees affect audit quality among the NGO sector in Uganda.    
 
2.3 Auditor independence and audit quality 
According to Gay and Simnett (2003: 745) Auditor independence is the ‘ability to withstand pressure from 
management influence when conducting an audit or providing audit-related services, so that the professional 
integrity of the auditor is not compromised’.  Auditor independence is thus a fundamental principle that underlies 
and influences the work of external and internal auditors, preparers and users of financial and procurement 
performance statements (Moore et al., 2006). Note that auditor Independence must be enhanced by instituting an 
independent audit committee that would ensure the decisions of both internal and external auditors are free from 
management influence (Kaawaase & Nkundabanyanga, 2017; Caswell & Allen, 2001).  
A study conducted in Uganda, Warabyeki (2008) established auditor engagement controls, internal 
governance controls, and the oversight of auditors to improve auditor independence, and so would be audit quality.  
Observance of auditor independence and audit quality seem to be anchored predominantly in having sound audit 
performance measures as well as the motivation of the auditors and other stakeholders to comply with the ongoing 
professional ethical standards (Ponemon & Gadhart,1990). 
According to Al-Khaddash et al. (2013) experienced auditors are likely to be more independent and produce 
better audit quality reports than unexperienced auditors since they can tactfully resist client management pressures 
and negotiate with ease over performance reporting concerns. In summary therefore, auditor independence is 
paramount in the delivery of quality audit work (Hardiningsih et al., 2019).    
H3: Auditor independence has a positive effect on audit quality.   
 
2.4 Auditor competence and audit quality 
Auditors are expected to possess the required professional competences acquired through formal education, 
professional certification, participation in symposia, seminars, trainings and experience (Hardiningsih et al. 2019; 
Zu’amah, 2009) to perform their work well. Such assertion implores smart auditors to strive to uphold competence 
through continuous professional knowledge update in order to   compete fairly in the audit global market.  Auditor 
competence is therefore expected to support in understanding the business run processes to enhance the audit 
procedures that would help in producing better quality audit reports (Ferdinand, Syaifuddin, Dali, & Masud, 2019; 
Christiawan, 2002).  
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online)  
Vol.11, No.6, 2021 
 
39 
H4: Auditor competence has a significant effect on audit quality 
 
2.5 Auditor tenure and audit quality  
Tenure is when the auditor holds a long-standing relationship with the client. This condition emboldens a 
profounder appreciation of the client’s financial and procurement condition (Hardiningsih et al. 2019). There are 
two contrasting views relating to the effects of auditor tenure on audit quality.  The first being, the longer the 
auditor-client relationship becomes the more likely will he auditor develop a closer relationship with a client, 
something that may prompt an auditor o serve management interests for such organization (Ndubuisi & 
Ezechukwu, 2017; González-Díaz, García-Fernández, & López-Díaz, 2015). Such view calls for mandatory audit 
partner rotation. As well, a long tenure tends to encourage the auditors to lose the professional skepticism by 
applying weak audit procedures that can essentially favour the clients in case client’s behavior remains unchanged 
overtime (Kaawaase & Nkundabanyanga, 2017). Such would reduce audit quality due to compromised 
independence, professional care and innovativeness of the auditors (Hardiningsih et al. 2019; Vanstraelen, 2000). 
The other view is that, “auditors understanding of the clients’ business increases as the auditor tenure grows and 
so is audit quality because auditors would have developed audit expertise to discover misstatements with the 
technical capabilities and knowledge acquired (Vanstraelen, 2000) during the course of their work. This is 
consistent with prior studies that have highlighted that long auditor tenure may not impair audit (Knechel, & 
Vanstraelen, 2007; Lim, Tan, & Cheng, 2010).  
H6: Auditor tenure affects audit quality 
 
2.6 Number of audit assignments and audit quality 
The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway Report (2010) suggest that the number of audits one handles 
reduces the amount time an auditor would spend to complete subsequent audit assignments. This, according to 
Persson (2011) can pose a risk of reduced quality control mechanisms which automatically undermines audit 
quality. According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986) auditors ensure that corporations comply with policies, laws 
and regulations but if at any one time they hold many client commitments, this condition might overstretch their 
ability to perform their duties appropriately.  In such a case the concentration of the auditors might be on getting 
excessive compensation than realizing the best audit outcome (Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 1999). 
The foregoing argument though, does not consider the other side of holding many assignments. Bauwhede 
and Willekens (2004) support the concept of holding a number of audit assignments for improved auditors’ 
performance. According to Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2004) many audits are more beneficial because such 
further the competence and experience of auditors in their professional work auditor.   An implication that with 
fewer assignments the quality of audit work would be lower.  
H7: The number of audit assignments significantly affects audit quality. 
 
2.7. Auditor’s age and audit quality 
Often society believes the older one becomes as an employee the less the outputs that a person produces (Rhodes, 
1983; Persson, 2011). However, most of the studies that Rhodes (1983) examines provide mixed results about the 
influence of age on audit quality. Findings therefore present inconclusive evidence. 
Similarly, Conroy, Emerson and Pons (2010) in their study on ethics in relation to age of auditors at different ranks 
provided divergent opinions. For instance, auditors at managerial level exhibited more acceptance for questionable 
ethical issues than lower level and young auditors (Conroy et al. 2010). Such provides the evidence that older 
auditors are capable of producing quality audits than their younger counterparts. 
H8: Auditors’ age significantly affects audit quality. 
 
3. Methodology  
A cross-sectional quantitative research survey design (Kothari, 2002) with self-administered questionnaires were 
employed to collect data from respondents. Questionnaires were distributed to finance/procurement managers in 
Uganda working for NGOs. While initially the interest was to collect data from individuals with finance and 
procurement expertize separately, only finance personnel were used since it was later discovered that unlike public 
sector entities most NGOs in Uganda, the finance personnel perform most of the procurement tasks. The article 
uses purposive sampling to identify 382 finance/procurement personnel that work with NGOs. We received back 
a total of 246 questionnaires (representing 64.4%) that were valuable for the study analysis. Table 1 below shows 
a summary of the respondents’ characteristics in terms of formal education level, whether they have 
accountancy/procurement professional qualification, and their position within their organisation. These 
characteristics mutually suggest that respondents had the knowledge and experience required to provide valuable 
survey responses. 
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Table 1: The demographic background 
Variable (N = 246) Freq. % Mean  SD Var Min. Max. 
Position    0.46 0.29 .21 0 1 
Finance/procurement manager   246 100      
Gender    0.42 .49 .25 0 1 
Male 162 65.85      
Female  84 34.15      
Age of respondent    2.96 .67 .45 1 6 
Below 19 0 0      
19 – 30 52 21.14      
31 – 40 134 54.47      
41 – 50 44 17.89      
51 – 60 16 6.50      
Over 60 0 0      
Qualification of the respondent   2.58 .98 .97 1 4 
Diploma 13 5.29       
Bachelors  196 79.68      
Masters  32 13.00      
PhD 5 2.03      
Professional certification   0.84 .86 .57 0 1 
Yes  207 84.15      
No  39 15.85      
No. of years of audit work   2.21 .92 .55 1 3 
3 years or less 48 19.51      
4-10 years 157 63.82      
Over 10 years 41 16.67      
Source: Primary data 
 
3.1 Data collection instrument and measures 
The instrument is divided into eight sections: section 1 provides the respondents’ demographic and background 
information. Section 2 to section 8 were dedicated to issues that extant literature identifies from previous 
scholarships (DeAngelo, 1981; Beatty, 1989; Deis & Giroux, 1992; Kaawaase & Nkundabanyanga, 2017; 
Hardiningsih et al. 2019; Abbott et al., 2016; Knechel, & Vanstraelen, 2007) that determine audit quality. We 
identify five issues related to audit quality, five issues on auditor firm size, three on auditor fees, nine on auditor 
independence, six on auditor competence, and five on auditor tenure and three on the number of audit assignments 
handled by an auditor. These issues were then anchored on a five-point Likert scale asking respondents as to 
whether in their opinion the different categories of issues would affect audit quality, whereby 1 = strongly disagree 
to 5 = strongly agree. These scales have been reviewed for correctness and applicability in the Ugandan setting 
with the help of 10 experts. A Content Validity Index of 0.80 and above for all issues in the questionnaire were 
obtained, indicating acceptable validity of the research for the pre-test.  
 
3.2 Data analysis tools 
The researchers used SPSS version 23 to analyse the data. First, simple frequency runs were to identify and fill 
missing data, and subsequently, validity and reliability tests, and correlation and multiple regressions were 
conducted. Principal component analysis and Cronbach’s alpha (α) coefficients were used to examine the validity 
and reliability of the scales as measures of audit quality, auditor fees, auditor independence, auditor fees, firm size, 
auditor competence, number of audit assignments handled by an auditor and auditor tenure. Principal components 
analysis using Varimax rotation method was used to establish convergent validity by extracting 7 suppressed factor 
loading coefficients to avoid lower loadings lower than 0.5. We also examined the appropriateness of the data for 
factor analysis based on the sample size adequacy, the Kaisa-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and the Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity. The KMO value from the test for all the factors was 0.889 and, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity for all 
the scales was statistically significant (p < 0.001). These results generally support the factorability of the 
correlation matrices since they are significantly different from the identity matrices in which the variables might 
not correlate with one another, hence absence of multicollinearity.  
Tests for reliability of all our scales reveal Cronbach’s α coefficients were above 0.7 (audit quality α = .813; 
firm size α = .811 auditor fees α = .801; auditor independence α = .899; auditor competence α = .798; auditor 
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tenure α = .776; number of audit assignments α = .788), hence internal consistency of the instrument (Hair, Black, 
Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Table 2 below shows the percentage variance of 93.6 in the entire model of the 
determining variable factors of audit quality among NGOs in Uganda.  
Table 2: Rotated PCA for the variable factors of the study. 
Scale items  Variable factors 
Firm size (FS) FS AF AI AC AT AQ AN 
The firm’s auditor is among the big four .895       
The auditor has all the staff needed to carry out all the assignments .923       
The auditor’s brand name is bigger than that of the clients they serve .884       
The audit firm uses higher technology to do their work .839       
Audit firm conducts their assignments without managements’ bias .798       
Auditor fees (AF)        
Auditor charges match the work that audit firms do  .871      
Our firm regularly pay higher fees if they find it appropriate  .887      
Higher auditor fees support auditors to do their work objectively  .896      
Auditor independence (AI)         
There is regulation of clients that are audited   .836     
Our firm usually has proper governance structures constituted   .827     
There is rotation of audit firms and audit partners   .801     
There is fear of disciplinary action by professional bodies   .799     
There is a risk of auditor reputation from public scandals   .794     
There is a requirement of annual auditor  reappointments    .773     
Auditors are required to obtain expert clearance from outgoing auditor   .822     
Auditor’s disclose non-audit fees paid to them by the same client    .766     
Auditor competence (AC)        


















The audit staff have the necessary audit experience of NGO sector     .756    
Our auditors can complete assignments within the shortest time possible   .844    
Audit staff are well trained to handle accountancy/procurement work 





Auditor tenure (AT)     .826   
Longer auditor stay with the client helps them to do their work better     .801   
You appreciate your client’s operations with time     .740   
Your long stay with client does not lead you to favour management     .803   
Even with a long tenure, auditor scepticism may not be hampered      .770   
Auditors will apply strong audit procedures irrespective of tenure length    .734   
Audit quality (AQ)        
Our auditor will detect and report a material misstatement      .838  
Audits support to improve the quality of financial/procurement and 





Use of big four by NGOs helps them to get more donor funding      .791  






The presence of audit systems is well embraced by NGOs      .799  
 Number of audit Assignments (AN)        
Having many assignments affects the work of your auditors       .887 
Having more clients usually overstretches your auditors to detect errors      .776 
Your auditor is always busy to provide adequate time to the organisation      .764 
Initial Eigen values 4.89 3.29 3.00 2.57 2.12 1.68 1.49 
Eigen values after rotation 3.12 3.03 2.89 2.86 2.84 2.81 2.79 
Total percentage variance  15.42 14.53 14.22 13.78 13.33 12.72 12.30 
Cumulative variance (%) 15.42 29.95 44.17 57.95 71.28 84.00 96.30 
Note: A principal component analysis with Varimax rotation was used, based on a sample size of 246, Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity sig. < 0.001 and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) sig. = 0.889. 
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To be able to conduct descriptive and relational analyses, the scale observed variables for each of the 
constructs were combined into a single variable using averages. This was done by computing a new variable for 
all the variable items represented by the variable factors that have been identified in the factor analysis.  
The model specification 
The new variables computed are presented in the models that follows hereunder that were used to examine the 
determining factors of audit quality 
audqual = β0 + β1fsize + β2audfees + β3audind + β4audcomp + β5audtenu + β6audassign + β7audage + ε ……….. 
(i) where, 
β0 = Constant 
β1 - β7 = Coefficient of parameter estimates 
audqual = Audit quality 
fsize = Firm size  
audfees = Auditor fees  
audind = Auditor independence  
audcomp = Auditor competence  
audtenu = Auditor tenure  
audassign = number of audit assignments 
audage = Auditor’s age in years  
ε = an error term 
However, considering the fact that perceptions about the work of internal and external auditors could be 
different among finance/procurement managers, it was necessary to identify if there are any differences between 
their responses. This means that model (i) can be respecified to include the dummy variable which takes on the 
value of zero (0) for external auditor responses and the value of one (1) for internal auditor responses. Where our 
results return a significant dummy variable, this would suggest significant differences in audit quality perceived 
between external and internal auditors in their practice. 
Therefore; 
audqual = α + β1fsize + β2audfees + β3audind + β4audcomp + β5audtenu + β6audassign + β7audage + β8dummy 
+ ε …. (ii) 
Source: Primary data 
All variables used in this study are audit quality as dependent variable and five other explanatory variables: 
perceptions of firm size, auditor fees, auditor independence, the number of audit assignments of the auditor and 
auditor tenure.   Each facet was examined using the mean, standard deviation, and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, 
see Table 3. Auditor competence generated the highest mean (3.91), followed by auditor fees (3.56), auditor tenure 
(3.38), auditor firm size (3.36), number of audit assignments handled by an auditor (3.07) and lastly auditor 
independence (3.33).  
 
4. Findings and discussions 
We present bivariate correlations and regression analyses about the relationships that exists between the 
determining factors of audit quality and themselves as well as audit quality which is true for correlations. 
Regression analyses reveal the extent to which the determining factors influence audit quality among NGOs in 
Uganda.   
 
4.1 Correlations 
Findings in Table 4 reveal that auditor independence has a significant positive correlation (r = .375**, p ≤ .01) 
with audit quality, as well as auditor fees (r = .308**, p ≤ .01) with audit quality. The same results are revealed 
between firm size (r = .180**, p ≤ .01) with audit quality, and auditor competence (r = .210**, p ≤ .01) with audit 
quality. This may be an indication that auditor independence, auditor fees, firm size and auditor competence could 
be determining factors of audit quality.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  N Mean Std. Deviation Items  Cronbach α 
audqual  246 3.27 0.32 5 .813 
fsize 246 3.36 0.34 5 .811 
audfees 246 3.56 0.78 3 .801 
audind 246 3.33 0.36 8 .899 
audcomp 246 3.91 0.56 6 .798 
audtenu 246 3.38 0.31 6 .776 
audassign 246 3.07 0.65 3 .788 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix  
Variables audind audage fsize audqual audcomp audassign audtenu audfees 
audind 1 .482** .056 .375** .032 -.206** -.109 .243** 
audage .482** 1 .090 -.103 -.023 -.132** .106 .137** 
fsize .056 .090 1 .180** .375** .220** .192** .112* 
audqual .375** -.103 .180** 1 .210** -.200** .131 .308** 
audcomp .032 -.023 .375** .210** 1 .298** .301** .093 
audassign -.206** -.132** .220** -.200** .298** 1 .255** -.225** 
audtenu -.109 .106 .192** .131 .301** .255** 1 .212** 
audfees .243** .137** .112* .308** .093 -.225** .212** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
On the other hand, auditor’s age negatively but insignificantly (r = -.103, p ≤ .05) correlates with audit quality, 
however, the number of audit assignments negatively correlates significantly with audit quality (r = -.200**, p 
≤ .01). The indication is that   of the two variables, many assignments may reduce the effectiveness of an auditor 
to conduct quality audits.        
 
4.2 Regression analysis 
Table 5 results are from model 1 specified “examining the relationship between all the independent variables 
(auditor independence, firm size, auditor fees, auditor tenure, number of audit assignments, auditor competence 
and auditor age) on audit quality. The model does not consider the effects of the dummy variable that reflect the 
effect of the nature of internal or external auditors. Overall, the model explains 24.6% of audit quality as a 
dependent variable given that adjusted R Square was .246. The model was well specified to reflect the overall 
effect of the explanatory variables on audit quality after introducing the dummy variable, since the F statistic of 
21.883 is realized and is significant at p < .001. Results indicate that auditor competence, auditor independence, 
firm size and auditor fees have positive significant relationship with audit quality, while the number of audit 
assignments has negative significant effects on audit quality. The rest of the independent variables such as auditor 
age and auditor tenure do not have significant effects on audit quality among NGOs in Uganda.  
Auditor firm size (β = 0.111, t = 2.277, p = 0.023) has been found to have a significant positive relationship 
with audit quality in line with hypothesis H1. This result is consistent with the assertions of Ndubuisi & Ezechukwu 
(2017) and Mahdi & Ali (2009) who find that the size of the firm matters a lot in ensuring audit quality. To these 
scholars, big firms can perform more accurate audit tests since they are normally well endowed with talented 
employees and superior technology which may support their cutting-edge audit performance compared to their 
small counterparts. This also implies that minimal error and misstatements arising from management self-interest 
behaviour could be found in financial and procurement statements audited by large firms. 









B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.919 .495  3.873 .000   
audcomp .247 .061 .200 4.029 .000 .793 1.261 
audind .277 .052 .279 5.346 .000 .720 1.389 
audassign -.210 .055 -.188 -3.798 .000 .800 1.249 
audfees .193 .055 .166 3.514 .000 .877 1.141 
audage -.053 .049 -.053 -1.071 .285 .762 1.313 
audtenu .009 .083 .005 .106 .916 .711 1.299 
fsize .111 .049 .111 2.277 .023 .823 1.215 
N 246 
R2 .257 
Adjusted R2 .246 
F statistic 21.883 
Sig. F statistic .000 
Durbin-Watson 1.925 
a. Dependent Variable:  audqual 
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Also, auditor fees have been found to have a positive relationship with audit quality that is statistically 
significant (β = 0.166, t = 3.514, p < 0.001). This is also consistent with our hypothesis H2, which is in fact in line 
with Francis & Simon (1987) who suggest that audit service quality can be differentiated by audit fees charged, 
meaning that the higher the auditor fees the better the quality. This does not however mean that lower auditor fees 
could signal lower audit quality. This is because Deis & Giroux (1996) find that initial audits with new clients 
might actually be linked to lower audit fees but with higher audit quality since it’s only used as a way to get new 
clients. This would therefore mean that managers of NGOs are likely to incur lower auditor fees initially but 
subsequently higher audit fees as long as they believe that the firm is going to deliver audit services of higher audit 
quality. Despite the mixed results by many scholars (see, Lim & Tan, 2008; Chung & Kallapur, 2003), the 
inconsistency might be as a result of excessive auditor fees charged (Choi et al. 2010) which might not be practiced 
among NGOs in Uganda. 
Results also show that auditor independence (β = 0. 279, t = 5.346, p < 0.001) and audit quality are positively 
and statistically significant. This supports hypothesis H3, which consistent with results from various studies (See; 
Ramadhanis, 2012; Arisinta, 2013; Darayasa & Wisadha, 2016; Chariri et al. 2017). This means that improving 
auditors’ independence is key to enhancing audit quality. Such could be done through engagement controls 
instituted in audit processes and audit service, and through internal governance measures like codes of ethics and 
oversight of auditors. Once independence is secured as indicated by Kaawaase and Nkundabanyanga (2017), audit 
quality is the ultimate as the auditor will be in position to issue an objective audit report that can be used in decision 
making by the stakeholders.   
Findings further reveal that auditor competence is statistically and significantly related to audit quality for 
NGOs in Uganda (β = 0.200, t = 4.029, p < 0.001), which supports hypothesis H4. This finding is consistent with 
a number of scholars (DeAngelo, 1981; Puspitasari et al. 2019; Sari & Susanto, 2018; Abbott et al. 2016) who 
believe that a competent auditor is high likely to discover and report errors and misstatements within the reporting 
system.  By implication auditors should keep abreast with the current professional knowledge to allow them 
compete favourably within the audit profession and market. This can be done through continuing professional 
education in order for auditors to preserve and expand their capabilities (Al-Khaddash, et al. 2013). This can 
therefore, improve auditors’ understanding of the client’s business processes as well as the audit reports. On the 
contrary, auditor tenure (β = 0.005, t = .106, p > 0.05) has been found to be insignificantly related to audit quality 
among NGOs operating in Uganda which is inconsistent with hypothesis H6.   
The number of audit assignments and audit quality have been found to be negatively and significantly related 
(β = -0.188, t = -3.798, p < 0.001), consistent with hypothesis H7. This implies that any small increase in the 
number of audit assignments is likely to reduce the level of audit quality. This finding is consistent with Persson 
(2011) who report that increases in number of audit assignments might reduce the overall time the auditor would 
spend on each assignment. Hence audit quality since the quality control mechanisms might reduce. It could also 
be true as many assignments might overstretch the auditors (Jiraporn et al. 2009) hence retarding audit performance. 
This is however inconsistent with the argument that auditors might benefit out of holding many assignments since 
their competences complying with audit procedures and writing audit reports might improve (Vander Bauwhede 
& Willekens, 2004). Lastly, findings reveal that auditor’s age may not have any effect on audit quality as was 
hypothesised in H8 (β = -0.053, t = -1.071, p > 0.05).   
Model 2examines the effects of all independent variables on audit quality together with a dummy variable 
relating to whether the audit assignment was done by an internal or external auditor. 
audqual = α + β1fsize + β2audfees + β3audind + β4audcomp + β5audtenu + β6audassign + β7audage + β8dummy 
+ ε …. (ii) 
Table 6 (model 2 results) helps in confirming hypothesis H5. Findings reveal that there were no significant 
differences between the responses made for internal and external auditors’ work (β = 0.002, t = .031, p > 0.05).  
This finding means that both internal and external auditors are likely to discover errors and misstatements and 
report them (DeAngelo, 1981). With the requisite professional competences, the audit quality of both internal and 
external auditors is expected to be high. This might demand that internal and external auditors keep up to the game 
with continuous professional trainings (Hardiningsih et al., 2019) so that they are able to institute reasonable audit 
procedures as they perform their work. This is likely to create harmony in the quality of audits between internal 
and external auditors that undertake work among NGOs in Uganda. The results following the effects of the other 
independent variables remained unchanged as in model 1 after the introduction of a dummy variable (see,Table 
6) .   
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t-statistic Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.187 .535  4.088 .000 
 audcomp .270 .064 .219 4.241 .000 
 audind .279 .052 .281 5.386 .000 
 audassign -.191 .057 -.170 -3.328 .001 
 audfees .186 .055 .160 3.374 .001 
 fsize .128 .050 .129 2.548 .011 
 audage -.098 .074 -.071 -1.323 .187 
 audtenu .010 .081 .006 .123 .899 
 dummy .003 .087 .002 .031 .976 
N 246 
R2 .261 
Adjusted R2 .248 
F statistic 19.044 
Sig. F-statistic .000 
Durbin-Watson 1.936 
a. Dependent Variable: audqual 
 
5. Conclusions  
We have examined the determining factors of audit quality among NGOs in Uganda, and established that auditor 
competence, auditor independence, firm size and auditor fees are likely to increase audit quality, whereas the more 
number of audit assignments handled reduce audit quality since auditors may not find appropriate time to properly 
execute audit assignments. Also, the study does not find significant effects between auditor tenure and auditor age 
on audit quality in the view of NGO finance/procurement staff. As well the study does not find any significant 
differences in the responses of the finance/procurement staff about internal and external auditors’ work. These 
findings present implications for auditors and audit firms in optimising their quality as perceived by the finance 
staff in the NGO sector.  
It is worth noting that since this study used cross-sectional research design, the possibility of monitoring the 
changes that would occur to the perceptions of the finance/procurement staff on the quality of audits as auditors 
perform their audit assignments over time might be limited. Further research may analyse the relationship between 
the audit quality determinants and audit quality in the public sector enterprises and NGOs in Uganda and those 
located in countries where the legal requirements are different. This research especially perceptions in the area of 
auditor tenure and auditor age might further add to audit quality theory that this study contributes to.  
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